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BASIC CONCEPTS IN AND TEMPORAL AND TERRITORIAL
LIMITS ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE PENAL LAW OF
JAPAN
SHIGEMITSU DANDO*
Translated by B.J. GEORGE, JR.**
Translator's Introduction
Japan is endowed with a sophisticated body of penal law which is
entirely statutory.' Regrettably, there is relatively little available in
English or other Western languages on Japan's penal law. 2 Conse-
quently, the translator commenced in 1987 a translation into English
of Dr. Dando's seminal treatise on the General Part of the Penal Law'
of Japan, of which the following constitutes Chapters 2 and 4.4 Dr.
Dando, whose fluency in Western languages is exemplary, has ap-
proved the translation.
5
* Formerly Justice, Supreme Court of Japan (1974-1983); Professor of Law Emeritus,
The University of Tokyo; Member, The Japan Academy; Counselor to The Imperial
Household.
** Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. The core of legislative coverage is the KEIHO (Penal Code), Law No. 45, 1907 (in
effect from Jan. 1, 1908) [hereinafter Penal Code]. The statute, with many amendments,
remains in current force. There is, however, a large body of criminal statutes scattered
throughout the Ropp-o zensho (Compiled Codes), although they are governed by the gen-
eral part of the Penal Code unless they specifically provide to the contrary. Penal Code,
supra, art. 8.
2. See G. KOSHI, JAPANESE LEGAL ADVISOR: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1970); HIRANO,
Some Aspects of Criminal Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCI-
ETY 274 (A. Von Mehren ed. 1963). A sprinkling of substantive law-related arts. may be
found in the various volumes of LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL.
3. S. DANDO, KEIHO KOVO SORON (Rev. ed. 1988).
4. Publication is envisioned, probably in late 1990, as a volume in the comparative
criminal law series edited by Professor Edward M. Wise of Wayne State University and
published by Fred B. Rothman Company, Colorado Springs, Colorado.
5. With Dr. Dando's approval, some portions of the original text have been adapted
for the purpose of meeting the needs and interests of foreign readers, and some refer-
ences to foreign resources on Japanese law have been added. The Penal Code of Japan is
available in English translation in Japan Ministry of Justice editions (undated); the
Eibun-Horeisha edition of Japanese statutes in English translation is another useful
resource.
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I. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan establishes the principle
that punishment cannot be imposed other than through "procedures
established by law," but that, of course, can rest only on the premise
that crimes and criminal punishments must be established through leg-
islation. That, in turn, means that the term "legislation," as used here,
is restricted to statutes enacted by the Diet. In other words, both defi-
nitions of crime and the limits of punishments must be laid down in
statutes couched in appropriately narrow terms.
The Meiji Constitution6 allowed rather broadly the promulgation
of administrative orders authorizing the imposition of criminal punish-
ment.7 Under the current Showa Constitution,8 however, although the
Cabinet may issue orders to execute the provisions of the Constitution
and laws, "it cannot include penal provisions in such cabinet orders
unless authorized by the law" in question.' Therefore, in the future
there can never be any comprehensive administrative authorization to
impose punishments, but only specific legislative mandates. 0 Obvi-
6. MEIJI KENPO (Meiji Constitution) arts. 9, 23 (1890) (Article 9 states: "The Em-
peror issues or causes to be issued, the Ordinances necessary for carrying out of the laws,
or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the wel-
fare of the subjects .... " MEIJI KENPO art. 9. Article 23 states: "No Japanese subject
shall be arrested, detained, tried or punished, unless according to law.").
7. Law No. 84, 1890 was entitled "Law Concerning the Punishment of Violations of
the Provisions of Administrative Orders," and set forth a general authorization that ad-
ministrative orders might provide for criminal penalties of a fine of not more than 200
yen or penal detention not to exceed one year. Beginning with the Police Infraction Or-
der (Ministry of Interior Order No. 16, 1909), a large number of penal regulations were
issued on the strength of that provision.
8. KENPO (Constitution) art. 73(6) [hereinafter Const.].
9. Id.
10. Concrete limitations must be set forth in the basic statute. 6 Keishu 1346 (Sup.
Ct., G.B., Dec. 12, 1952). Local Autonomy Law art. 14(5) states that criminal penalties
can be imposed for violations of local ordinances enacted by ordinary local public bodies,
although that provision may present some constitutional difficulties. Because appropriate
restrictions govern this provision, however, and because an administrative order or regu-
lation must be based on an ordinance or by-law adopted by a district assembly, it may
pass constitutional muster. Indeed, the constitutionality of the provision has been sus-
tained by the Supreme Court on that premise. 16 Keishi 577 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
May 30, 1962).
Compare the Order for the Punishment of Acts Prejudicial to Occupation Objectives
(Cabinet Order No. 325, 1950), which could not be considered valid unless somehow it
were viewed as having a super-constitutional basis. 7 Keishii 1562 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
July 22, 1953). Penalties that exceed those authorized in a statute obviously are invalid.
359 Hanreijiho 63 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., Dec. 24, 1963).
If a statute prescribes only a penalty, but the elements of the substantive crime are
delineated through an administrative order authorized by the Cabinet, it should be con-
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ously, this establishes much more strictly than under the Meiji Consti-
tution the principle that crimes must be defined by statute.
Based on the principle that the source of penal law must be legis-
lation, customary law can never be a direct source of penal provisions,"
although it nonetheless may exert a wide array of indirect influences
on penal law. To illustrate the distinction, the term "acts according to
laws and ordinances" in Penal Code, Article 3512 may include acts
based on customary law. In the same way, the property which is the
object of theft and related property crimes must be that "of another";
customary law, as one might expect, casts light on whether given prop-
erty in fact is that of another. These examples illustrate that not infre-
quently customary law plays an important role in the determination of
the illegality of certain acts, or in the interpretation of the contents of
stitutional as long as there is an adequate reason for the order and it is limited to special
circumstances. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 94 is an example: It imposes punishments
for violations of ordinances relating to neutrality in a war between foreign states. This
sort of legislative approach, which German scholars call Blankettstrafgesetze, in effect
incorporates ordinances in the Penal Code by reference. See A. SCHONKE & H. SCHRODER,
STRAFGESETZBUCH KOMMENTAR 7-8 (22d ed. 1985) [hereinafter SCHONKE-SCHRODER].
[Throughout this Article, counterpart terminology from Roman law systems is included
to facilitate a comparative law search into western concepts that have had significant
impact on the formation of Japanese penal law. - Trans.].
In that context, National Public Service Law, arts. 102(1), 110(1) and 110(19) punish
public employees who violate the prohibition against political activity on their part, and
define "political activity" according to rules of the National Personnel Authority. This
creates a problem if one contrasts the consequences of such activity in the form of crimi-
nal penalties with disciplinary measures. In the Sarufutsu case, 28 Keishu 393 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., Nov. 6, 1974), a majority of the Court sustained the constitutionality of the stat-
ute, over a dissent by Justices Nobuo Ogawa, Kenichiro Osumi, Yoshikitasu Sakamoto
and Kosato Sekine.
Provided this underlying principle is honored, regulations of lower-ranking agencies
as well as Cabinet orders may be utilized for the purpose. See 4 Keishiu 73 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., Feb. 1, 1950) (interpreting the Foodstuff Control Law (Law No. 40, 1942) arts. 9,
10, 31); 12 Keishiu 1272 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., May 1, 1958) (interpreting National Person-
nel Authority rules).
[The citation style followed in this translation is that in Form of Citation of Japa-
nese Legal Materials, 42 WASH. L. REV. 591, 593-95 (1967). The attribution "Keishi"
refers to the collection of either the prewar Daishin'in (Great Court of Cassation) or the
present Supreme Court reports of criminal decisions (Keiji Hanreishu). Officially unre-
ported decisions are cited to commercial publications, e.g., Hanreijiho. "G.B." refers to
the Grand Bench, or all 15 Justices sitting en banc, while "P.B." indicates a holding by a
petty bench consisting of five Justices. - Trans.].
11. Under what German scholars call the derogierende Funktion, however, penal pro-
visions can lose their effect on the basis of customary law. [On custom as a source of law
in the Roman law tradition, see J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 24-25 (1969). -
Trans.].
12. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 35 provides: "An act done in accordance with laws
or ordinances [horei] or in the pursuit of lawful business is not punishable."
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the constituent elements of a crime.
The use of judicial precedents as a source of criminal law poses a
problem in this context. One might naturally assume, on the basis of
the preceding discussion, that it is impermissible to view judicial deci-
sions as a source of law. Nevertheless, more broadly considered, prece-
dent exerts a rather powerful effect in the field of criminal law. Thus,
the mission of precedent surely is to fix the outer limits of the literal
text of a statute, by establishing through interpretation, for example,
the constituent elements of a crime, and therefore its actual coverage,
within the ultimate limits set by the statutory text.
In the contrast to the field of civil (noncriminal, nonpublic) law, in
which judicial interpretations need not adhere strictly to the literal
text of code provisions, it is not necessarily erroneous to say that, in
the sphere of criminal law, interpreting decisions not only should
honor statutory language quite strictly, but that such a process appears
to promote the legal stability of judicial precedents. The principle of
nullum crimen sine lege demands that the elements of criminal of-
fenses remain firmly fixed.
Nevertheless, statutory provisions themselves, no matter how
strict their terms and how great an accumulation of the stated ele-
ments of offenses, can express but an abstract stereotype of a crime.
Only as courts hand down adjudications in a number of specific cases
do their cumulative precedents for the first time begin to shape the
concrete content of the elements of a given crime. If one recognizes
that sort of formative function in legal precedents, then not only does
this not run counter to the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena
sine lege, but must be viewed as in truth mandated or impelled by that
principle. Even if some precedents deviate in the direction of delineat-
ing the elements of or authorizing punishment for a crime, that does
not contradict the above principle. The author's position is that, within
the limited meaning expressed above, judicial precedent, even though
arguably it ought not be placed in the same rank as legislation, still
should be viewed as one form of a source of law. 3
It is essential under the principle of legality that the contents of
13. See Dando, Das Legalitdtsprinzip und die Rolle der Rechtsprechung und der
Theorien: Zugleich zur Methodik der Strafgesetzgebung, in FESTCHRIFT FOR ERNST HEi-
Nrrz 37 (H. Ltittger, H. Blei & P. Hanau eds. 1972). Though precedent can be recognized
as a source of law compatible with stability in legal principles, a certain measure of pru-
dence must be exercised in making changes in existing precedents. In the Supreme
Court's United Agricultural and Forestry Ministry Employee's Union case, 27 Keishii
547 (Sup. Ct., G.B., March 25, 1973), five Justices, including Justice Jiro Tanaka, as a
minority group, urged the exercise of a certain measure of caution in altering precedents.
Id. at 597ff.
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the constituent elements of crimes, and particularly the scope of penal-
ties, be fixed clearly in legislation. If this should not be accomplished
definitively, it invites the arbitrary exercise of official powers and
sharply restricts the free activities of the people. One should consider
in that regard the precedents in the United States that invalidate legis-
lation on void-for-vagueness grounds. 4 It is especially important to
give careful attention to the doctrine that strikes down on vagueness
grounds legislation exerting a limiting or chilling effect on the freedom
of expression guaranteed in the Constitution.' That doctrine, at any
rate, ought to be recognized in the course of construing the provisions
of Article 31.16
Punishments' as well as definitions of crime must be fixed by law
also. A problem in that regard, however, is whether or not absolute
14. See, e.g., the doctrinal discussions in Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 57 (1988);
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
15. Const., supra note 8, art. 31: "No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor
shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established
by law."
16. This was a particular problem in the Tokushima Municipal Ordinance case, 29
Keishiu 489 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Sept. 10, 1975). In 1952, Tokushima City enacted Ordinance
No. 3, which provided that the City Public Safety Commission, in issuing a permit for a
mass parade, could impose conditions broadly concerning the matter of maintaining or-
derly traffic, and authorized the imposition of penalties for violations of those conditions.
The language in which the ordinance was couched had to be viewed as extremely inap-
propriate. According to the Court's judgment, however, "the issue of whether a criminal
provision should be considered void for vagueness under article 31 should be determined
according to a criterion of whether ordinary citizens might have the ability to understand
whether specific actions they have in mind are proper or not under its terms." In the
instant case, based on that criterion, the Court held that there was insufficient danger
that the commission might abuse its discretion and hence ruled that the ordinance was
not unacceptably vague. Id. Compare with, however, the author's supplementary opinion.
Id. at 514-17.
Other judgments sustaining the constitutionality of statutory provisions in the face
of void-for-vagueness attacks include 24 Keishiu 153 (Sup. Ct., 2d P.B., Apr. 24, 1970)
(the provisions of the Law Controlling the Counterfeiting of Currency and Securities art.
1: "having an outward appearance likely to obscure [mislead]"); 24 Keishu 280 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., June 17, 1970) [extracted in H. TANAKA, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 774-75 (1976)
[hereinafter H. TANAKA] (Minor Offenses Law art. 1(33), first clause: "without good rea-
son"); 24 Keishiu 12 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., July 2, 1970) (Subversive Activities Prevention
Law arts. 39-40); 27 Keishu 1205 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., July 10, 1970) (Income Tax Law
arts. 234(1), 242(8)); 27 Keishiu 547 (S. Ct., G.B., Apr. 24, 1973) (United Agricultural
and Forestry Employees' Union case) (National Public Service Law art. 110(1)(vii): "acts
of incitement").
17. It has been maintained that legal limitations on punishments do not advance the
cause of protecting freedom, see, e.g., G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART
464 (1st ed. 1953), but that does not render the nulla poena concept superfluous.
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certainty is required. If neither the category nor magnitude of punish-
ment, or if only the category and not the magnitude, is prescribed, the
security functions of the criminal law are seriously impaired; that is
obvious in the first alternative but also present in the latter. The nulla
poena principle requires both type and magnitude of punishment to be
fixed by law if its primary objective is to be achieved.'
II. JUST AND COMMENSURATE PUNISHMENTS
The language of Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan'9 had its
genesis in the due process provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion."o Consequently, although the expression "due process" does not
appear in the text of Article 31, that provision properly should be con-
strued as incorporating the requirement that statutes imposing crimi-
nal penalties comport with due process. The concept that not only pro-
cedures, but substance as well, must be fair should be recognized as
commensurate with the mandates of what is called in the United
States "substantive due process." That concept should comprehend
both: (1) the requirement that criminal statutes be sufficiently precise;
and (2) the principles governing the interpretation of criminal penalty
provisions, discussed in the preceding part. The principle of parsimony
of punishment 2' might well be considered a dimension of the just pun-
ishments concept. Substantive due process contains a vast array of spe-
18. Under § 103(2) of the Basic Law [Grundgesetz] of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (as was true under § 116 of the Weimar Constitution), "acts may be punished
only if their punishability [Strafbarkeit] was fixed by law before they were committed."
(emphasis added). This was incorporated intact into § 2 of the 1953 Penal Code
(now § 1 of the current 1975 Code). Before the 1935 Nazi Government revision of the
Code, § 2 was precisely the same as the current law. Article 2 of the 1935 revision, how-
ever, provided that an act might be punished: (1) if it was declared punishable by spe-
cific provisions of law, or (2) if it deserved punishment according to "basic concepts of
penal law and the sound feelings of the people." At the time, certain scholars maintained
that this was definitely permissible under the principle of legality. The validity of that
premise had, however, been discredited by the time the commentary to the 1962 draft
revised code had been published. See ENTWURF EINES STRAFGESETZBUCHS (STGB) MIT
BEGRONDUNG 106 (1962).
19. See supra note 15.
20. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
21. That principle has come to be recognized in both the interpretation and applica-
tion, as well as the enactment, of statutes imposing criminal penalties. As to the inter-
pretation process, see the Nagoya Central Post Office case, 31 Keishiu 182 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
May 4, 1977). In that case, the Supreme Court, construing Article 3 of the Public Cor-
poration Labor Relations Law, resolved an important issue by holding Article 1(2) of the
Trade Union Law to be inapplicable to labor disputes involving employees of public cor-
porations and other entities. Id. The author, in dissent, invoked the parsimony principle
in support of his position that Article 3 should govern.
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cific applications, but two of them especially should be taken up in the
present context.
First, in the course of enacting penal legislation, it is imperative to
ascertain the legal interests"2 that should be protected through penal
statutes, and the scope of those safeguards; a determination of neces-
sity should underlie the legislative process. In particular, care should
be exercised that fundamental human rights are not infringed through
criminal law provisions.
The second point bearing on fairness is that criminal penalties set
forth in legislation should be proportionate to the harm inflicted.23
Cruel punishments are absolutely prohibited by the Constitution, 4 of
course, but even penalties that are not cruel in the constitutional sense
ought to be viewed as violative of due process, 5 if they are remarkably
disproportionate. Criminal penalty provisions should conform to
whatever the prevailing social values embrace as appropriate. An eval-
uation of criminal penalties, however, must not be undertaken as if
those penalties are intended to provide redress for an actor's infringe-
ment of private rights; that is the objective of private law. The criminal
law, which regulates the relationship between individuals and the en-
tirety of society, is governed by a concept of allocation or distribution.
The lex talionis, an "eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," reflected an
ancient culture that did not differentiate between civil and criminal
responsibility. In contrast, the proportionality of punishments man-
dated by the legality principle in modern law must be aimed at pro-
tecting the whole body of society, and must reflect an evaluation of
each penalty on behalf of that body."
22. In recent years, the concept of decriminalization has been stressed in many coun-
tries, particularly the United States. In other words, there should be a reduced reliance
on criminal punishments, and a retreat from over-criminalization. This is not unrelated
to the rationale underlying the principle of parsimony, and should be considered a way
of concentrating the energies of the police, criminal justice system and correction on
serious crimes. Among the wealth of literature on the point, N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS,
THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL (1970), and H. PACKER, LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968), are particularly helpful.
The problem of a legal interest [h'oeki; Rechtsgut; bien juridique; bene giuridico] is
not only very important as a matter of legal interpretation, but also is highly relevant to
legislation-related discussions in the context of this portion of the main text. See also
SCHR6NKE-SCHRODER, supra note 10, at 109 paras. 8-10.
23. The principle occasionally is stated expressly in foreign constitutional provisions.
See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 2(2) (1961); cf. ILL. CONST. art. 1 § 2 (due process and equal
protection clauses).
24. Const., supra note 8, art. 36.
25. Id. art. 31; see supra note 15.
26. What society views as moral varies from country to country, depending on its
system of values. For example, a great majority of countries that retain the death penalty
1988]
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Proportionality of punishment does not govern the legislative pro-
cess alone, but extends as well to the stage of adjudication. It is neces-
sary for the courts to assess a suitable specific penalty based on the
facts of each case.2 7 This should be what is meant by the concept of
"individualization of punishment."2 Adherents of the so-called mod-
ern school of penology have argued that criminal penalties should be
individualized, not according to the danger that offenders pose to soci-
ety, but rather according to their social adaptability; some of them
even went so far as to advocate an extension of sanctions beyond the
limits of punishment prescribed by law-even an abolition of all limits
on punishment.2 9 That, however, very clearly runs counter to the prin-
ciple that penalties must be proportionate to harm.
III. THE INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES
The principle of legality forbids the application of penal provisions
by analogy."s Since the imposition of criminal penalties should be ac-
in theii legislation apply it in cases of murder. In contrast, the Soviet Union, governed
by a different value system, had provided for a much less severe penalty of deprivation
of liberty not to exceed eight years for all categories of homicide including murder, with
the sole exception of aggravated murder which had been punishable by deprivation of
liberty for ten years or less until the death penalty was authorized for murder, effective
Apr. 30, 1954.
Moreover, value systems often change in the course of history. On the aspect of
evolution in the criminal law, see generally H. MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION (1946); D. OEHLER, WURZEL, WANDEL AND WERT DER STRAFRECHTLICHEN
LEGALORDNUNG (1950).
Problems have arisen in this context concerning the relevance to the fairness of
criminal penalties of two provisions of the Constitution: Article 11, states that "the peo-
ple shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights"; and
Article 13, states that "all the people must be respected as individuals," and that their
right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness should be the paramount consideration
in legislation and other governmental affairs, "to the extent that it does not interfere
with the public welfare." Relevant precedent includes 2 Keishiu 1934 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
Dec. 27, 1948); 10 Keishu 1331 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., Sept. 11, 1956) (concerning whether
identical punishments may be assessed for intentional crimes and crimes of negligence);
15 Keishiu 725 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Apr. 20, 1961) (concerning whether inflicting death
and inflicting injury can be punished identically).
27. In assessing penalties, undue reliance on either general prevention [General-
prdivention; prevention g~n~rale] or special prevention [Spezialpriivention; prevention
sp~ciale] creates a risk of contravening the requirement of proportionality, and thus of
violating human rights. This can be true to some extent as well in the context of protec-
tive measures. Cf. N. MORRIS & C. HOWARD, STUDIES IN CRIMINAL LAW 157-63 (1964).
28. See R. SALEILLES, L'INDIVIDUALISATION DE LA PEINE (2d ed. 1909).
29. See E. KRXPELIN, DIE AESCHAFFUNG DES STRAFMASSES (1880).
30. Some statutes state the principle directly, e.g., Louisiana Criminal Code art. 3;
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 14:3 (West 1986). There are also provisions to the effect that the
[Vol. 9
THE PENAL LAW OF JAPAN
complished through legislation, the courts should not extend the legal
limits established in that way in the guise of interpreting that legisla-
tion. There are two points that ought to be kept in mind in that
regard.
The first point is that neither the definition of criminality nor
statutory penalty provisions properly may be expanded through anal-
ogy to the detriment of an actor. In particular, analogy may not be
used to expand the constituent elements of a crime beyond those set
forth in the specific language of the penal statute itself. Even if it ap-
pears appropriate from the viewpoint of criminal policy to punish
those acts, that should be a problem for the legislative branch to ad-
dress, not the judicial. That certainly does not mean, however, that
courts cannot construe statutory language delineating the constituent
elements of a given crime. Instead, they should select a rational inter-
pretation that comports with the legal stereotypical crime projected in
each statutory provision, even if on occasion they have to transcend
the literal language of the legislation in doing so." In other instances,
the courts can give an expansive reading to specific terms within a stat-
utory definition of a crime.2 Only in that sense can one understand the
general language of a penal code should be construed according to the fair import of its
terms, but if the statutory language can support constructions, then it should be inter-
preted in a manner that promotes the general objectives of the code and the special
purposes of the individual statutory section undergoing interpretations. See N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 5.00 (McKinney 1982); ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.01(3) (1985); see also W. SAX,
DAS STRAFRECHTLICHE "ANALOGIEVERBOT" (1983); Ancel, L'Analogie en droit pnal, 26 R.
INT. DROIT PIkNAL 277 (1955). On analogy in the ancient Chinese T'ang Code, see W.
JOHNSON, THE T'ANG CODE 36-38 (1979).
31. For example, the term "occupation" [or enterprise] [gyomul [the Japanese term
in romaji, or Western phonic notation - Trans.] in Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 211,
which penalizes those who cause injury or death through a want of care in the conduct of
a business or occupation, carries no specific literal limitations. It should be construed,
however, to include only occupations or enterprises that, by their nature, involve a risk
to human life and bodily integrity or otherwise give rise to a duty to safeguard life and
bodily integrity.
On the matter, see 12 Keishu 1090 (Sup. Ct., 2d P.B., Apr. 18, 1958); 39 Keishu 362
(Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Oct. 21, 1985) 9 K-saikeishiu 1336 (Hiroshima High Ct.,
Dec. 25, 1956) (meaning of the term "damage" [sonkai] in Penal Code supra note 1, art.
98, penalizing aggravated escape based on "damaging" or destroying a detention facility
or restraints).
32. For example, a gasoline-powered train was properly construed to fit within the
term "steam or electric-powered train" ["kisha, densha"] in Penal Code, supra note 1,
art. 129, which penalizes the negligent endangerment or destruction of such vehicles. 19
Keishiu 540 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Aug. 22, 1940) [summarized in H. TANAKA, supra note 16, at
106-07]. The means of powering railway equipment-steam, electricity, or gaso-
line-have no significant distinguishing relevance to the application of Article 129. In
contrast, a bus, which does not operate on a railway right-of-way, cannot be expected to
19881
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premise that interpretation by analogy is not permitted, but that an
expansive interpretation"3 is acceptable.
The second point of concern in this context is that interpretations
tending to benefit offenders properly may be considered to lie outside
the principle of legality, and therefore, simply fall within general prin-
ciples of statutory interpretation. Particularly in the context of nonre-
sponsibility based on want of illegality or culpability, there should be
no objection to considering anything that is relevant in its characteris-
tics to the issue of responsibility, whether or not it is referred to specif-
ically in legislation, as long as this is done rationally in the context of
the entire legal order. 4
fall within the coverage of that provision. Buses would be covered by a different law,
namely, the Road Transportation Law art. 136.
There are other precedents bearing on the problem of interpretation through anal-
ogy that should be considered: 9 Keiroku 874 (Gr. Ct. Cass., May 21, 1904) [translated
in H. TANAKA, supra note 16, at 105-06] (theft of electricity, now expressly included as
property in Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 245, was brought within the coverage of the
pre-1907 Penal Code term "property," which did not expressly refer to electricity); 13
Keishiu 483 (Gr. Ct. Cass. June 21, 1934) (taking fish by the use of fish hooks violated a
statutory prohibition against catching and gathering fish by means of a "gaff"); 17
Keishiu 614 (Gr. Ct. Cass., July 28, 1938) (a prohibition against trafficking in birds or
animals covered a transfer of animal hides or bird skins); 9 Keishu 381 (Sup. Ct., 3d
P.B., Mar. 1, 1955) [summarized in H. TANAKA, supra note 16, at 104] (the National
Personnel Authority rule 14-7 term "candidate" does not include a person who intends
to become a candidate); 14 Keishiu 1139 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., July 14, 1960) (crime of
failing to pay overtime compensation under Labor Standards Laws arts. 37(1), 119(1)
was committed even though the overtime labor itself was performed in violation of that
law); see also 13 Keishiu 1577 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Nov. 17, 1934); 9 Keishu 1189 (Sup. Ct.,
G.B., June 11, 1955) (the Mitaka case, concerning the interpretation of Penal Code art.
127 - the aggravated crime of endangering railway or maritime traffic).
Compare other judgments placing a restrictive interpretation on legislation: 11
Keishu 1275 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Mar. 28, 1957) (simple hoarding of tobacco for use of
guests at a hot-springs inn did not constitute preparation to sell tobacco in violation of
arts. 29(2) and 71(5), last clause, of the Tobacco Monopoly Law); 31 Keishu 96 (Sup. Ct.,
1st P.B., Mar. 25, 1977) (theft of forest products in violation of Forest Law art. 197 is
not governed by Penal Code art. 242, which views an owner's property in the possession
and control of another person as property subject to theft).
33. Ausdehnende Auslegung; see SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 10, at 28, paras 55-
56.
34. Precedent also recognizes, at least in theory, the propriety of considering factors
excluding culpability even though they are not stated affirmatively in legislation. See 10
Keishiu 1605 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., Dec. 11, 1956) (first headnote). The Supreme Court,
however, displayed a negative attitude toward it in practice. Cf. 12 Keishu 3439 (Sup.
Ct., 3d P.B., Nov. 4, 1958).
In contrast, grounds for withholding imposition of punishment, by their nature,
ought to be stated specifically in legislation, but if they are not, they still may be recog-
nized in the process of statutory interpretation if sufficient grounds for that action exist.
Punishability, conceptually speaking, comes into being, as a matter of principle, when a
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Precision in the delineation of the constituent elements of crime
crime is constituted (a matter not of time, but of logic in the sense that punishability
accompanies crime). Nevertheless, there are instances in which punishability is subjected
to special conditions, called prerequisites to punishability or, by some, objective condi-
tions to punishability [objective Bedingung der Strafbarkeit; condizione obiettiva di
punibilitd]. See also SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 10, at 133-36, paras. 73-83.
Examples include the legal finality of a bankruptcy adjudication for crimes relating
to bankruptcy, Bankruptcy Law arts. 374-376, 378; the legal finality of a decision to com-
mence reorganization proceedings in the context of a crime of fraudulent corporate reor-
ganization, Corporation Reorganization Law arts. 290, 291; official enforcement actions to
collect delinquent taxes in criminal obstruction of tax enforcement, National Tax En-
forcement Law art. 32; and assumption of the status of a public official after commission
of the crime of receiving, promising to receive or demanding a bribe in relation to future
duties as a public official, Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 197(2).
In several contexts, the absence of certain factors is a condition to punishability.
These may be called grounds barring punishability (Strafausschliessungsgrinde]. See
also SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 10, at 425-26, paras. 127-31. To illustrate, accom-
plices who lack the personal status of relatives are ineligible for a remission of punish-
ment under Penal Code art. 257(2), available to certain relatives who commit the crime
of receiving property obtained through a property crime, id. art. 256, from other such
relatives, id. art. 257(1). Therefore, the actor's personal status ordinarily serves to remit
penalties, and thus is a ground barring punishability. The same thing should govern the
nonpunishability of theft committed between close relatives, id. art. 244, but there are
certain problems of interpretations peculiar to that context.
There are problems if grounds barring punishability are based on other than statu-
tory provisions. As long as the elements of an offense are not lacking, to go beyond legis-
lative language by withholding punishment is to imply that governmental conduct is ir-
regular and the governmental exercise of the power to punish [ius puniendi] is unjust.
One might compare by analogy the doctrine of entrapment as developed by United
States court precedents. See C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 443-54 (2d ed. 1986). There is one precedent that
rather strikingly appears to have gone beyond statutory coverage in finding grounds bar-
ring punishability - the Nagoya Central Post Office case. 31 Keishiu 182 (Sup. Ct. G.B.,
May 4, 1977). The Court in that case barred punishability on the basis of legislative
process and the maintenance of equilibrium with other statutes. The author dissented
from the Court's judgment, but on other grounds agreed with the Court on this particu-
lar point. Id. at 240.
There are other illustrations of personal factors barring punishability:
(1) Under Article 51 of the Constitution, members of the two Houses of
the Diet cannot be held accountable for speeches, debates or votes cast
during legislative sessions. There are, of course, a number of problems
bearing on the objectives of that provision. [Compare U.S. CONST. art
I § '6, cl. 1; see United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S 477 (1979). -
Trans.].
(2) Under international law, foreign ambassadors cannot be punished for
crimes they commit in a host country. This is not simply a matter of
criminal procedure, as one precedent has held. 27 Keirokii 187 (Gr. Ct.
Cass., March 24, 1921). Some scholars, however, urge that this be con-
strued as a matter of personal status precluding punishability under
substantive penal law.
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should be sought in the course of interpreting legislation, just as it
must during the legislative process itself." This also is the case when
Thus, under this principle, personal factors barring punishability turn ordinarily on
an actor's personal status. There are various policy reasons undergirding both prerequi-
sites to punishability and personal factors barring punishability, which are unrelated to a
normative evaluation of either the acts or the actor, and unrelated to the elements of a
crime (although there are proponents of the premise that prerequisites to punishability
should fall within the purview of illegality).
There are two points to be noted as a consequence:
(a) Acts are illegal even though prerequisites to punishability cannot be
met or personal factors are present barring punishability. That means,
in turn, that (as an example) even though relatives within the relation-
ships specified in Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 244(1), cannot be pun-
ished for theft, there is still room to punish accomplices who lack the
status of relatives. In the same way, either a relative or one who is not
a relative can assert a defense or justification based on protection of
rights against imminent and unjust infringement, id. art. 36, concern-
ing the acts of a relative who is not punishable under Article 244(1).
(b) The elements reflecting prerequisites to punishability or personal fac-
tors barring punishability of an actor bear no relationship to the pres-
ence or absence of criminal intent. There is a lower court precedent to
the contrary, however. 3 Kosai Keishii 487 (Fukuoka High Ct.,
Oct, 17, 1950). The court held that, in an instance in which someone
stole property under the mistaken belief that it belonged to someone in
the same household, the case should be adjudicated in conformity with
Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 244.
35. In this sense, the Supreme Court properly held, in its United Agricultural and
Forestry Ministry Employees Union case, 27 Keishu 547 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 25, 1973)
[extracted in H. TANAKA, supra note 16, at 806-11], that "an unclear (although restric-
tive) interpretation will impair the protective function of the stereotypical constituent
elements of crime in legislation, and may even be considered to violate art. 31 of the
Constitution, which requires clarity in legislative language." 27 Keishiu at 564.
The same premise applies to the interpretation of prerequisites to punishability in
general as well as to the constituent elements of crime. Even in the context of illegality
(which by its nature transcends any particular legal provision), courts should avoid, as
far as possible, an interpretation that obscures the borderline between the existence and
nonexistence of illegality. For example, in the Tokyo Central Post Office case, 20 Keishii
901 (Sup. Ct., G.B. Oct. 26, 1966), the Supreme Court construed Article 34 of the former
Public Corporations and Government Enterprises Labor Relations Law [now the Na-
tional Enterprises Labor Relations Law] against the background of Trade Union Law
art. 1(2). It considered the actions of employees in the context of a public labor dispute
or strike as essentially lawful under Article 1(2) unless they impaired seriously the public
interest [kokuminseikatsu]. That standard, as expressed in the Court's opinion, was not,
of course, absolutely precise. The author could not support the holding of the Court in
its later Nagoya Central Post Office case, 31 Keishiu 182 (Sup. Ct., G.B., May 4, 1977)
(which found Article 1(2) not to govern public employee labor disputes). The author
thought the Tokyo Central Post Office holding on the applicability of Article 1(2) to be
correct, so that it should have controlled the Nagoya Central Post Office case as well, but
believed that the Court's standard in the Tokyo Central Post Office case, based on seri-
ous impairment of the public interest, was too imprecise. Therefore, the author main-
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judicial interpretation of the constituent elements of a crime is restric-
tive, and in that sense favorable to a defendant.
The principle, mentioned earlier," that "statutory provisions
should be construed rationally and, as far as possible, consonantly with
the spirit of the Constitution and in accord with its terms," is reflected
in judicial precedent."7 It is obvious on the basis of that principle that
restrictive interpretations of legislative language will be required on
occasion.
IV. PROHIBITION AGAINST RETROACTIVITY OF PENAL LEGISLATION
The matter of a transitory or interim penal law 8 presents a special
problem in this context. In particular, the idea that it is wrong to apply
penal laws retroactively has come down to us from ancient times; 9 it
has been recast in the form of the principle of legality that provides
the principal content of the prohibition against retroactive punish-
ments. That principle is embodied in a number of constitutions.4 0 Al-
though the prohibition against retroactivity did not appear expressly in
the Meiji Constitution, the principle was acknowledged in judicial
precedents of the time. It is firmly fixed today in Article 39 of the Con-
stitution, which provides that "no person shall be held criminally liable
for an act which was lawful at the time it was committed." The Penal
Code reflects a corollary principle in Article 6, which states that "when
a punishment is changed by law after the commission of a crime, the
lesser punishment shall be applied." The rationale of the prohibition
against retroactivity even dictates the retrospective application of new
tained that the Tokyo Central Post Office standard should have been made more precise
in conformity with the legality principle, and that the criminality of public sector labor
activities could not be determined properly unless that were done. Therefore, the de-
fendants should have been acquitted. See id. at 226-27, 238-39.
36. See supra note 30.
37. Accordingly, a judgment concerning the constitutionality of a given statutory pro-
vision also should be based on a reasonable interpretation of that provision, as described
in the main text, without excessive regard for the literal language of the provision in
question. See 23 Keishu 305, 310 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 2, 1969) (Tokyo Teachers Ass'n
case); 23 Keishiu 685 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Apr. 2, 1969) (United Judiciary Workers, Sendal
Branch case).
38. Intertemporales Strafrecht; droit pknal transitoire; diritto penale transitorio.
39. The doctrine was recognized in ancient Greece, and appeared strongly in the writ-
ings of Hobbes and others. During the T'ang and Sung dynasties in China, the principle
of nonretroactivity of punishments and even the concept of the retroactivity of reduced
penalties were recognized. During the Ming dynasty and thereafter, however, retrospec-
tive penalties became the practice.
40. [See U.S. CONsT. art. I § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1; Miller v. Florida, 107 S. Ct. 2446
(1987); Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). - Trans.].
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legislation that provides a lesser punishment.
There are three dimensions that should be explored. First, if cer-
tain acts are to be punished, a legal provision authorizing their punish-
ment must have been promulgated, before their commission, through a
statute or an appropriately authorized administrative order.4' This is
the significance of the constitutional language, "no person shall be held
criminally liable for an act that was lawful at the time it was commit-
ted." If a penal provision has been promulgated by the time of a
criminal act but the actor is unaware of the fact, the problems are
those of ignorance of the law'" and unawareness of the illegality of that
act. In other words, this should be considered a matter of criminal
intent."
Second, if a punishment is changed by law after the commission of
a crime, the lesser of the punishments (old and new) should be ap-
plied."5 The criterion for "after a crime" is the time of the criminal
activity-the acts of perpetration." Even if a crime requires that speci-
fied consequences flow from an act,"7 the critical time should not be
the emergence of those results, but rather that of the acts of perpetra-
tion. It is natural to think of these points as falling within the principle
41. On the promulgation of laws and orders, see 11 Keishiu 3461 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec.
28, 1957) (method of promulgation); 12 Keishiu 3313 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Dec. 15, 1958)
(time of promulgation).
42. Const., supra note 8, art. 39.
43. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 38(3) states: "Ignorance of the law is not the
equivalent of a lack of intent to commit a crime; provided, however, that punishment
may be reduced in light of the circumstances."
44. Cf. ALl MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 30, § 2.04(3)(a).
45. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 6 states: "When a punishment is changed by law
after the commission of a crime, the lesser punishment shall be applied."
46. Commencement d'ex~cution; Anfang der Ausfihrung. The German statutory
term now is Verwirklichung des Tatbestandes, see STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] § 22 (W.
Ger.) [hereinafter German Criminal Code], but the concept probably has not changed.
See SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 10, at 282-83, paras. 24-31. Consequently, in the
setting of a single crime, for example, a continuing criminal transaction, if the penalty is
changed during the time period through which the criminal activity continues to take
place, it is not a matter of a critical selection between the old and new provisions, but
simply of applying the new provision. 6 Keishii 1093 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Sept. 25, 1953);
cf. STGB § 2(2) (W. Ger.) (Draft 1962) [hereinafter West German Draft Penal Code of
1962].
Even if there is a single crime for the purpose of determining punishment, the prece-
dent appears to apply the same premise. See, e.g., 17 Keiroku 1314 (Gr. Ct. Cass.,
June 23, 1911) (related crimes [kenrenhan]). The author entertains doubts about that
interpretation, however, because from the substantive aspect they ought to be viewed as
separate crimes.
47. Kekkahan; Erfoigsdelikte; reato di envento; see German Criminal Code, supra
note 46, § 18; SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 10, at 252-53, paras. 1-3.
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of legality. When a "change in punishment""8 occurs, however, con-
cerning the order of gravity of punishments,4 9 and the choice is be-
tween the penalty in force at the time of the criminal act and that in
effect at the time of adjudication, the lesser of the two should be se-
lected. Should there be an interim penalty between that in force at the
time of the criminal act and that in effect at the time of the adjudica-
tion, the least of the three should be selected, for otherwise an unfair
punishment may well be generated."0
In instances in which there is no change in penalties between a
new statute and its predecessor, scholarly opinion is divided as to
which statute should be applied. From the standpoint of criminal legis-
lation as a model or standard for judges, there is relatively strong advo-
cacy, as one might expect, for the premise that the statute in force at
the time of adjudication should govern. Because there may be a prob-
lem in deciding whether the old or the new statute should serve as the
standard for a particular case, however, the logical necessity of such an
interpretation is not inevitable. Preferably, the problem should be
evaluated with the principle of nonretroactivity of criminal penalties as
the base, which in turn means that the law in force at the time of crim-
inal activity should govern. Judicial precedent adopts that analysis.51
Third, the power to impose criminal punishments lapses if a penal
provision governing criminal activity has been repealed by the time of
48. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 6, does not govern later changes that do not affect
punishment. Examples include changes in the prescriptive period [statute of limitations]
governing the offense, cf. KEIHO SHIKKO H5 art. 13 (Law No. 29, 1909) (Japan) (Law for
the Enforcement of the Penal Code) [hereinafter Law for the Enforcement of the Penal
Code]; the period governing institution of prosecution, cf. KEIJISOSH5HO SHIKKO H5 art.
6 (Law No. 249, 1948) 2 E.H.S. 2601 (1985) (Japan) (Law for the Enforcement of the
Code of Criminal Procedure); and criteria to determine whether the prerequisites for an
accusation have been met, id. art. 4.
In contrast, changes in periods of detention in a workhouse (see Penal Code, supra
note 1, art.18; KEISHOO art. 505 (Law No. 131, 1948) (Japan) (Code of Criminal Proce-
dure)) ought to fall within the provisions of Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 6. 20 Keishu
425 (Gr. Ct., Cass., July 17, 1942). Precedent, however, does not hold that way if
changes are made in statutory provisions governing requirements for suspending the exe-
cution of a sentence. See 2 Keishiu 694 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., June 22, 1948); 2 Keishu
1660-61 (Sup. Ct., G.B. Nov. 10, 1948). The author thinks that inappropriate, as did
Justice Tsuyoshi Mano in his dissenting opinion.
49. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 10; cf. Law for Enforcement of the Penal Code,
supra note 48, art. 2.
50. Cf. Draft Penal Code art. 2(2). [The Draft Penal Code of 1975 has not been
adopted thus far by the Diet. The Preliminary Draft and commentary were published in
English. See A PREPARATORY DRAFT FOR THE REVISED PENAL CODE OF JAPAN 1961 (B.
George ed. 1964), presented in 8 AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES. - Trans.]
51. 13 Keishii 28 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Jan. 31, 1933).
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adjudication.2 Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, if this occurs,
the sentencing court should enter a judgment of acquittal." One
should note, however, that the problem of legislation with a stated pe-
riod of effectiveness, addressed in the next part, constitutes an impor-
tant exception to what has been discussed in this context.
V. TIME-LIMITED LEGISLATION
Legislation that carries within its own terms a specified period of
legal effectiveness is called time-limited legislation."' The West Ger-
man Penal Code55 provides expressly that "a law stating a fixed period
of effectiveness from the time of its enactment is to be applied, after it
has ceased to be in force, to criminal acts committed during its period
of effectiveness."" There are examples of administrative criminal stat-
utes in Japan that contain language to the same effect. Because the
Penal Code contains no specific provisions paralleling the West Ger-
man law, however, criminal penalties probably cannot be enforced af-
ter the statutes defining the underlying criminal activity have lapsed,
unless the contrary is expressed through special language in any penal
statute encountered outside the Penal Code.
There are, however, two counterarguments to that conclusion. One
is that time-limited legislation properly may continue to govern crimi-
nal acts committed during its stated period of effectiveness, unaffected
by its ensuing loss of force. That conclusion seemingly rests on the pre-
mise that there is no practical probability of exacting punishments
during a limited period of statutory effectiveness, which would render
52. Under certain foreign penal codes, even if the repeal occurs after a criminal sen-
tence has been determined and announced, the criminal penalty and the power to en-
force it are extinguished. This is explicit, for example, in CONGO PENAL [C.P.] art. 2(1)
(Brazil) [hereinafter Brazilian Penal Code]; Danish Criminal Code art. 3(2); Greek Penal
Code art. 2(2); CoDIcE PENALE [C.P.] art. 2(2) (Italy) [hereinafter Italian Penal Code].
53. Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 48, art. 337(2); see also id. arts. 383(1)(ii)
(ground for koso appeal), 411(1)(v) (ground for jokoku appeal).
54. Genjih-o; Zeitgesetz; tempordres Gesetz; loi temporaire; legge temporanea. The
basic concept includes statutes that govern criminal acts committed during their stated
period of effectiveness and which are enforced after they have lapsed. For purposes of
clarity in terminology, it probably is more appropriate to call this "substantive time-
limited legislation," in contrast to "formal or modal time-limited legislation," a more
appropriate designation for the concept in the main text. Ultimately, of course, it be-
comes a considerable problem to correlate the two concepts, "substantive" and "formal."
55. West German Draft Penal Code of 1962, supra note 46, § 2(4); see SCHONKE-
SCHRODER, supra note 10, at 50-51, paras. 34-40.
56. Other legislation to the same effect includes Brazilian Penal Code, supra note 52,
art. 3; Danish Criminal Code, supra note 52, art. 3(1); Greek Penal Code, supra note 52,
art. 3; Italian Penal Code, supra note 52, art 2(4); Romanian Penal Code art. 16; see also
infra note 59.
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the criminal penalty provisions utterly meaningless. If there is a special
provision in the statute addressing the point, however,it is easy to re-
solve problems as they arise.'"
The second counterargument distinguishes between instances in
which the legal interpretation changes, following abrogation, concern-
ing the punishability of acts committed before abrogation, and those in
which there is simply an alteration in the factual context. In the first,
the abrogation of penalties renders acts done before abrogation
nonpunishable, while in the second the punishability remains. This is
called the "motivation" theory. 8 Nevertheless, because the distinctions
between the two categories of cases are highly correlative, such a the-
ory is likely to impair stability in legal principles. Some scholarly opin-
ion in Japan emphasizes the motivational theory, not only concerning
time-limited legislation in the strict sense, but also with reference to
statutes of an interim or transitional nature.5 9
Penal Code, Article 6, as well as the Code of Criminal Procedure,
Article 337(i),1 is extremely significant from the standpoint of the
nullum crimen or legality principle.6 1 In view of the absence of express
57. Other considerations exist as well. An example may be found in the repeal in
1947 (Law No. 124) of the earlier Penal Code coverage of crimes against the Imperial
House and the crime of adultery. The supplemental provisions to the repealer statute, by
their terms, stated that the repeal went into effect on the twentieth day after promulga-
tion. The repeal thus converted the Penal Code provisions in question into a species of
time-limited legislation (contrasting, of course, with the usual form of such legislation,
which fixes the period of effectiveness at the time of enactment and not at a later time).
Even the proponents of the position restated in the main text, however, probably would
not claim that such crimes committed before the repeal became effective could have been
punished afterwards, for the simple reason that there was no practical possibility of im-
posing punishment after the repealed provisions had ceased to exist.
58. Motiventheorie. For illustrations of the motivation theory in the context of pro-
posed legislation, see STGB § 6(4) (Ger.) (Draft 1919) [hereinafter German Draft Penal
Code of 1919]; STGB § 2(2) (Ger.) (Draft 1922) [hereinafter German Draft Penal Code
of 1922]; STGB § 2(2) (Ger.) (Draft 1925) [hereinafter German Draft Penal Code of
1925]; STGB § 3 (Ger.) (Draft 1927) [hereinafter German Draft Penal Code of 1927].
These codes stated in effect that statutory provisions eliminating coverage on the basis
of special facts nevertheless covered acts committed while the coverage was in effect,
thus allowing enforcement even after the statute had lost its effectiveness. Such provi-
sions were eliminated, however, from the STGB (Ger.) (Draft 1930) [hereinafter German
Draft Penal Code of 1930].
59. Rinjih-o. German precedent seems to apply the above-quoted § 2(4) to both
time-limited and temporary legislation without regard to the specific language of the
provision.
60. Article 337(ii) provides that a judgment of acquittal on procedural grounds
[menso] must be entered "where the punishment has been abolished by a law or ordi-
nance enforced subsequent to the commission of an offense." See S. DANDO, JAPANESE
LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 145, 385 (B. George trans. 1965).
61. See supra note 10.
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statutory language in Japan corresponding to the provisions of the
West German Penal Code, Section 2(4),2 courts should not recognize
any exception to the nullum crimen principle simply for practical rea-
sons of crime control.
One must take note of instances, however, in which changes are
made, not in the provisions setting forth the legal elements of an of-
fense, but rather in provisions relating solely to the facts corresponding
to those elements. 3 For example, the Civil Code used to embody a
family relationship between the stepparents and stepchildren identical
to that prevailing between natural parents and the children of their
marriage.6 4 That relationship was eliminated from the revised Civil
Code. If before that revision took place, however, a stepchild should
have murdered a stepparent, the crime still would have been that of
killing an ascendant,6 and there would have been no escape from crim-
inal liability if the stepchild had been prosecuted and convicted after
the Civil Code revision. In the same way, for example, under price con-
trol legislation, it is proper to view subsequent changes in price-control
regulations as having no impact on the criminality of contraventions
occurring before amendment.6 6
62. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
63. It may be difficult to distinguish between the two, but a determination neverthe-
less can be made whether a given legal provision covers solely the legal elements of a
crime.
64. Former Article 728 of the Civil Code provided that "the same relationship exists
between a stepfather or stepmother and the stepchild as ... between parent and child."
65. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 200. That assumes the statute is constitutional
under Const., supra note 8, art. 14(1) (stating that "[all the people are equal under the
law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because
of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin."). The Supreme Court so held initially,
6 Keishu 1441 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Dec. 25, 1952), rev'd, 27 Keishiu 265 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
Apr. 14, 1973) [translated in H. Tanaka, supra note 16, at 725-28]. The author agrees
with the later precedent, although on somewhat different grounds bearing on the breadth
of the penalties.
66. The following case notes indicate the shifting position in precedent:
(a) 17 Keishu 853 (Gr. Ct. Cass., Oct. 29, 1938). In the Law Temporarily Restrict-
ing the Transfer of Horses (Law No. 89, 1937),the transfer or movement of horses in
certain specified locations required a government permit. After the accused had trans-
ferred a horse without a permit, administrative orders issued by the Ministries of the
Army and of Agriculture and Forestry removed the place of the transfer from the statu-
tory coverage, so that permits no longer were required. At first-instance trial the accused
was convicted despite the intervening governmental action, and a summary order issued.
The Procurator-General maintained in the government's statement of reasons in opposi-
tion to an application for emergency jokoku appeal that the case did not involve time-
limited legislation. The Great Court of Cassation, in allowing the appeal, vacating the
summary order and dismissing the prosecution, stated the following grounds for its
actions:
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If acts are committed at a place covered at the time by prohibitory regulations,
but thereafter the regulations are changed so that the location no longer is cov-
ered, the result is that "the place is [no longer] governed by legal restrictions
under art. 2 of the Law, and the constituent elements of that crime no longer
exist. Accordingly, the penalties set forth in the Law no longer can be assessed.
This decree might well be considered by some as a temporary or interim measure treated
as time-limited legislation. Those emphasizing a teleological analysis, however, as well as
administrative law specialists, have voiced strong criticisms of the holding in this case.
(b) See 19 Keishu 401 (Gr. Ct. Cass., July 1, 1940); 15 Keishiu 459 (Gr. Ct. Cass.,
July 18, 1940). Under the Temporary Measures Law Concerning Import and Export
Commodities, whatever price-control regulations were in force at the time a violation
occurred governed; the fact that, after the criminal act had been committed, the regula-
tion in question was withdrawn had no effect on criminality. The objective of the statute,
according to the first of the two decisions was: "To determine an appropriate price in
light of the economic circumstance prevailing at the time in question; as it was antici-
pated from the outset that the provision would be altered if future circumstances war-
ranted it, the provisions in force at the time of activity would govern that activity."
(Statute Repealed). According to the second of the two precedents, therefore, even
though there are many examples of specific legislative language to the effect that provi-
sions in force at the time of an act should be applied even though they were later
changed, "even in default of such specific language, the same interpretation should be
placed on the legislation in question."
(c) Following the conclusion of the Pacific War, however, one or two precedents
took a contrary view of the matter.
(d) Soon thereafter, a judgment of the combined divisions of the Great Court of
Cassation affirmed the judgments summarized in (b), supra. Unreported case (Gr. Ct.
Cass., Apr. 15, 1947) (stated that "[t]here appears to be no reason to alter the holding of
this judgment. Therefore, inconsistent prior judgments [as stated in (c), supra] are to be
disregarded and the earlier judgment of the Division of the Court will govern later
cases.").
(e) 4 Keishu 1972 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 11, 1950). This decision was the first Su-
preme Court judgment tracking the position of the Great Court of Cassation. The case
involved what was designated as the Price Control Regulation. The defendant sold ap-
ples for an amount exceeding the price that could be charged under Finance Ministry
Directive (No. 581, 1946), based on an earlier version of the Regulation. Shortly after-
wards, the directive was rescinded. According to the Court, based on the language of
Article I of the Regulation, the Regulation itself was destined, sooner or later, to be
rescinded after the unusual economic difficulties during the postwar period had ceased to
exist. Therefore, to quash the criminal penalties already assessed before rescission, based
on the rescinding of directives issued under the Regulation, was inconsistent with the
objectives of the Regulation. Justice Nobori Inoue, Saburo Iwamatsu and Tsuyoshi Mano
dissented, however, from the Court's holding that the criminal penalties should not be
quashed. The Court's conclusion is consistent with the premise advanced by the author
in the main text, although he agrees with Justice Mano's dissent criticizing as "irrespon-
sible" the Court's reasons for concluding that the statute should be construed as a form
of time-limited legislation.
(f) Two ensuing precedents refused to apply the concept of time-limited legisla-
tion. See 7 Keishii 1562 (Sup. Ct., G.B., No. 325 (wa) 1950, July 22, 1953) (dealing with
the Order for the Punishment of Acts Prejudicial to Occupation Objectives); 8 Keishiu
1791 (Sup. Ct., G.B. No. 343 (wa) 1950, Nov. 10, 1954) (addressed the Public Utilities
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VI. TERRITORIAL LIMITS AFFECTING PENAL LAW"'
The Penal Code6 applies to persons who commit crimes within
Japan69 or on board Japan-registry vessels70 or aircraft71 outside Japan,
whether the offenders are Japanese nationals or not. In other words,
Japan follows the territorial principle.
72
Order) [hereinafter Electric Industries Strike Case]. Both Orders were considered some-
what special provisions governing a limited context.
(g) 9 Keishu 344 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Feb. 25, 1955), considered whether criminal pen-
alties for violating the Customs Law provisions relating to the clandestine, illegal import
or export of commodities in the territory of a foreign country should be quashed if the
location of the activity were subsequently considered not to be within the territory of a
foreign nation. The Court refused to quash the criminal penalties originally imposed on
violators.
(h) Soon thereafter, however, the Court changed its position on the matter and
ordered the criminal penalties quashed. 11 Keishiu 2497 (Sup. Ct., G.B., Oct. 9, 1957).
(i) The Court addressed the issue again in 16 Keishiu 345 (Sup. Ct., G.B.,
Apr. 14, 1962). Provisions of a Niigata prefectural traffic ordinance, prohibiting two per-
sons from riding together on a bicycle fitted with a motor, were rescinded after the viola-
tion at issue. The Court, however, ruled that the
subsequent rescission did not have to constitute grounds for quashing the criminal pen-
alties assessed in the case.
It is obvious from the above summaries that the doctrine has been in disarray, a
disarray largely brought about by changes in judicial personnel which have had an unfor-
tunate effect of impairing the development of sound doctrine. The precedents cited
supra in paragraphs (a) through (e) adopt essentially the same premise as the author's
but the cases in (h) and (i) obviously take a contrary position.
67. The problems discussed in the present context should not be confused with the
matter of the competence of courts to adjudicate criminal cases arising outside Japan.
See S. DANDO, supra note 60, at 43.
68. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 1.
69. If any portion of the acts corresponding to the material elements of a crime oc-
curs within Japan, then the entire crime is considered to have been committed there.
Legislative examples, covering attempted crimes, and providing that the place where an
offender intended the results of activity to occur is the place of the crime, include the
German Draft Penal Code of 1925, supra note 58, § 9; German Draft Penal Code of
1922, supra note 58, § 9; German Draft Penal Code of 1930, supra note 58, § 8; SCHWE-
IZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGBJ art. 7 (Switz.) [hereinafter Swiss Penal Code]. To
the author, however, this seems wrong even as a matter of statutory principle.
70. A Japanese vessel is defined in Vessels Law art. 1, as a vessel with Japanese gov-
ernment registry. On vessels under a bareboat charter, see Consular Convention,
Mar. 22, 1963, United States - Japan, arts. 19-21, 24, 15 U.S.T. 768, 799-804, 806,
T.I.A.S. No. 5602, at 33-37.
71. "Aircraft" is defined in Aviation Law arts. 3-2, 4; see also Treaty on International
Recognition Rights in Aircraft, opened for signature June 19, 1948, art. XVI, 4 U.S.T.
1830, 1840, T.I.A.S. No. 2847 at 12.
72. Zokuchishugi; Territorialprinzip; see West German Draft Penal Code of 1962,
supra note 46, § 3-4; SCHONKE-ScHRODER, supra note 10, paras. 4-5, 69-70, at 53-54,
commentary to § 3-4, at 53-54. [On the corresponding United States doctrine, see, e.g.,
Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 3,
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By its terms, the Penal Code"3 applies to such crimes as arson,7 4
homicide 7  and theft7 e committed by Japanese nationals7 7 outside Ja-
pan. Within the limits thus established through Article 3, Japan has
recognized the personality principle.
7 s
The crimes of insurrection7 9 promoting foreign aggression," coun-
terfeiting currency and uttering it,81 forgery of documents, etc.,82 coun-
terfeiting securities,83 and counterfeiting or wrongfully using official
seals and marks8 are punishable if committed outside Japan 6 by any-
8-11 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1986); George, Jurisdictional Bases for Criminal Legislation and
its Enforcement, MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 3, 4-5 (1983). - Trans.].
73. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 3; see also Law for the Enforcement of the Penal
Code, supra note 48, art. 27.
74. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(i); see id. arts. 108, 109(1), 119 (referring to
damages to structures by flooding), and art. 3(1)(ii).
75. Id. art. 3(1)(vi); see id. arts. 199-200, 3(1)(vii) (referring to crimes of bodily in-
jury), arts. 204-205, 3(1)(viii) (referring to crimes of abortion), arts. 214-216, 3(1)(ix) (re-
ferring to aggravated abandonment and death or injury from abandonment), arts. 218-
219, 3(1)(x) (referring to wrongful imprisonment and death or injury resulting from it),
arts. 220-221, 3(1)(xi) (referring to kidnapping and abduction), arts. 224-228, 3(1)(xii)
(referring to defamation), and art. 230.
76. Id. art. 3(1)(xiii) (referring to theft and robbery), arts. 235-236, 238-241, 243,
3(1)(xiv) (referring to fraud and extortion), arts. 246-250, 3(1)(xv) (referring to embezzle-
ment in the conduct of business), arts. 253, 3(1)(xvi) (referring to certain acts of receiv-
ing), art. 256(2). The remaining offenses covered by the article are in art. 3(1)(iii) (coun-
terfeiting and forgery), arts. 159-161 (as well as falsification of electromagnetic records),
arts. 161-162 amended by Penal Code through Law No. 52 (1987), art. 3(1)(iv) (counter-
feiting or wrongful use of private seals and attempted wrongful use), and art. 167.
77. Under Const., supra note 8, art. 10, "the condition for being a Japanese national
shall be determined by law." See generally Nationality Law.
78. Zokujinshugi; Personalittitsprinzip; see SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra note 10, at 71,
paras. 6-7; id. at 54, paras. 1-2, commentary to German Penal Code § 5. The principle
originally was recognized in old German law. The penal law of the Soviet Union (e.g.,
RSFSR Penal Code art. 5) is a recent example of the legislative use of the personality
principle. RSFSR, CIMINAL CODE, [C. CraM.] art. 5 (USSR). [On the corresponding
United States doctrine, see Blakesley, supra note 72, at 22-27; see also George, supra
note 72, at 4, 6, 23. - Trans.].
79. Penal Code, supra note 1, arts. 2(1)(ii), 77-79.
80. See id. arts. 2(1)(iii), 81, 82, 87, 88.
81. See id. arts. 2(1)(iv), 148 (including attempts).
82. See id. arts. 2(1)(v), 154, 155, 157, 158, 161-62.
83. See id. arts. 2(1)(vi), 162, 163.
84. See id. arts. 2(1)(vii), 164-166 (including attempts to violate Articles 164(2),
165(2) and 166(2).
85. Whether or not certain offenses are included in the enumerations within Articles
2 and 3 has an impact on the interpretation of their constituent elements. See Penal
Code, supra note 1, arts. 2, 3. For example, Penal Code art. 175 is not enumerated in
either article. The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "purpose of sale" in Article
17 to include only sales which will take place within Japan. 31 Keishiu 1176 (Sup. Ct.,
P.B., Dec, 22, 1977).
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one, whether a Japanese national or not."" In addition, persons who are
public officers of Japan may be punished if, while outside Japan, they
commit the crimes of allowing detained persons to escape, 7 drafting
false official documents 8 and certain forms of abuse of authority. 8
All cases falling within Article 4, and at a minimum the crimes of
insurrection 0 and promoting foreign aggression 91 within Article 2, have
the objective of safeguarding various legal interests of Japan, and thus
fall within the spirit of the so-called protective principle.2 By virtue of
the partial revision of the Penal Code in 1947, Japan had moved some-
what away from the protective principle," but until 19871" had not sig-
nificantly gravitated in the direction of reliance on the universality
principle. 5 Admittedly, there had been at least a glimpse of that prin-
ciple in certain portions of Article 2,"" particularly the references to
counterfeiting and wrongful use or attempted use of private seals. 7 In
addition, Article 7 of the Draft Penal Code reflects the trend in that
86. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 2; Law for the Enforcement of the Penal Code,
supra note 48, art. 26.
87. Penal Code, supra note 1, arts. 4(1)(i), 101 (including attempts, id. art. 102).
88. Id. arts. 4(1)(ii), 156.
89. Id. art. 4(1)(iii), referring to Article 193 (abuse of authority), Article 195(2) (vio-
lence or cruelty by a guard or escort against a person in custody), Article 197(1)-(4)
(bribery offenses), and the killing or injury of persons during violations of Article 195(2).
90. Id. art. 2(1)(i).
91. Id. art. 2(1)(ii). Articles 2(1)(v) and 2(1)(vii) do not reflect the so-called universal-
ity principle, but rather the protective principle. The deleted provisions of Article 2(1)(i)
covered crimes against the Imperial House defined in the now-repealed Articles 73-76 of
the 1907 Penal Code.
92. Hogoshugi; Schutzprinzip; Realprinzip; see SCHONKE-ScHRODER, supra note 10,
paras. 1, 7, 71, commentary to German Penal Code, § 5, at 54. [On the corresponding
United States doctrine, see Blakesley, supra note 72, at 17-22; George, supra note 72, at
4, 6, 15-18; see also Banks, International Activities and Criminal Considerations Under
United States Antitrust Laws, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE 51 (V. Nanda & M. Bassiouni eds. 1987); Extraterritorial Criminal
Jurisdiction in Securities Laws Regulation, in id. at 79. - Trans.].
93. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(ii), before its revision in 1947, provided that
"anyone who commits any of the listed crimes outside the Empire of Japan against a
national of the Empire of Japan is also punishable." This represented a clear application
of the protective principle.
94. See infra notes 100-119 and accompanying text.
95. Sekaishugi; Universalprinzip; Weltrechtsprinzip; see SCHONKE-SCHRODER, supra
note 10, paras. 8, 75-77, commentary to German Penal Code, § 6, at 54. [On the corre-
sponding United States doctrine, see Blakesley, supra note 72, at 31-33; George, supra
note 72, at 4. - Trans.].
96. See also Law for the Enforcement of the Penal Code, supra note 48, art.
26(1)(iii)-(iv); Law Punishing Violations of the Revenue Stamp Law art. 4.
97. Penal Code, supra note 1, arts. 2(1)(iv), 167.
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direction manifested in certain contemporary foreign statutes9 8 and, if
adopted, would expand the limits of offenses governed by the
principle. 9
In 1987, the Diet took an important step toward recognition of the
universality principle in the context of the development of new policies
against international terrorism.100 Through that enactment, the Penal
Code was brought into conformity with two newly-ratified interna-
tional conventions:"0 ' the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents,"0 2 and the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages. 0 3 The provisions of the 1987 law conform to those
two conventions' by: a) establishing criminal penalty provisions based
on contraventions of their terms; and 2) expanding the limits of pun-
ishability for crimes committed outside Japan. Only the latter dimen-
sion is addressed briefly in this context. Under the new Article 4-2 of
the Penal Code:
98. See German Draft Penal Code of 1925 and subsequent drafts, supra note 58.
Legislative examples include Greek Penal Code, supra note 52, art. 8 and German Fed-
eral Republic Penal Code art. 6.
99. Under Article 4(1)(vii) of the Preliminary Draft Penal Code, crimes of trafficking
in pornography and solicitation for sexual intercourse would have been included, but
Article 7 of the Draft Code eliminated such coverage, despite Japan's ratification of the
International Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Pornography (Treaty No. 3,
1936). This elimination of Draft Code coverage is based on the very evident and marked
difference of opinion in various countries over whether criminal law should be used as a
basis to intervene in matters of sexual morality.
100. Law for the Partial Revision of the Penal Code, Etc. (Law No. 52, 1987).
101. There are actually three earlier international conventions directed against
hijackings as countermeasures against international terrorism to which Japan is a party,
namely, the Tokyo Hijacking Convention, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (Japan Treaty No. 5, 1970); the Hague Hijacking Convention,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (Japan Treaty No. 19,
1971); and the Montreal Hijacking Convention, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T 564, T.I.A.S. No.
7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 (Japan Treaty No. 5, 1974).
102. G.A. Res. 3166, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), at 147, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974)
[hereinafter UN Diplomats Convention] (opened for ratification by the United Nations
in 1973; in effect since 1977; ratified and promulgated by the Government of Japan as
Treaty No. 3 of 1987).
103. G.A. Res. 34/416, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979) (hereinafter UN Hostages Convention] (opened for ratification by the United Na-
tions in 1979; in effect since 1983; ratified and promulgated by the Government of Japan
as Treaty No. 4 of 1987).
104. Because of the phenomenon of international terrorism in recent years, the UN
General Assembly urged the speedy ratification of both treaties by each member state.
That, in turn, came to be a focal point for debate within the UN concerning the relation-
ship between international terrorism and popular liberation movements.
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In addition to the three preceding articles, the provisions of
this [Penal] Code apply to and may be invoked against any
person who commits outside Japan a crime set forth in Book II
[The Special Part of the Penal Code] and [who is] required to
be punished, even though [the crime was] committed outside
Japan, by virtue of international treaties.'0 5
Counterpart language was inserted at the same time in the Law Con-
cerning the Punishment for Taking Hostages'08 and the Law Concern-
ing the Punishment of Violent Acts. 07
These enactments conform to the obligations that Japan under-
took on the basis of Article 3(1) of the United Nations Diplomats Con-
vention'08 and Article 5(1) of the United Nations Hostages Conven-
tion.'0 9 One should differentiate as a matter of logic the concept of the
power to adjudicate from that of the limits of the applicability of penal
law. Nevertheless, in essence, as Japanese courts are called upon to ap-
ply these penal provisions which Japan was required to enact by virtue
of its status as a party to the two conventions, there is reason to antici-
pate that they will exercise their adjudicatory powers only concerning
extraterritorial acts which appropriately may be punished by Japan.
The provisions falling under the new Article 4-2 apply to persons
who are not Japanese nationals although, of course, it is necessary to
extradite them or otherwise secure their physical presence before Japa-
nese courts before they can be tried in accordance with constitutional
principles. As discussed above,"0 the provisions of Articles 2 through 4
of the Penal Code already made punishable crimes committed abroad
(although the above-mentioned special statutory provisions created ex-
105. Law for the Partial Revision of the Penal Code, supra note 100, art. 4-2.
106. Law No. 48, 1987, art. 5.
107. Law No. 60, 1926, arts. 1, 2. Thus the provisions of Article 4-2 are couched in a
comprehensive form to the extent they relate to the various crimes defined in the Penal
Code. The special punishment-related provisions in the particularized legislation de-
scribed in the text in form extend the power to punish criminal acts committed abroad
only concerning those two specified laws; because they are not comprehensive there is at
least some possibility that they will prove inefficacious in the future. Because the provi-
sions relating to the punishability of extraterritorial crimes are founded in the power to
punish, they should be considered circumspectly in the specialized form in which they
are stated and viewed within the spirit of Const., supra note 8, art. 31. Indeed, there is
some danger that the requirements of the conventions embodying policies against inter-
national terrorism have been developed without a full consideration of this matter; these
requirements may well make it necessary in the future to revise the legislation based on
actual circumstances.
108. See supra note 102.
109. See supra note 103.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 68-89.
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ceptions to their coverage), but standing alone they could not fulfill
completely the requirements of the two international conventions
adopted by Japan. Consequently, new legislation was necessary ad-
dressing matters lying outside the existing provisions. That is the sig-
nificance of the language, "in addition to the three preceding articles,"
in Article 4-2.
The terminology in Article 4-2, "by virtue of international trea-
ties," refers not only to the current international treaties but also to
ones which Japan may ratify in the future. As of now, however, Article
4-2, because of the United Nations Diplomats Convention,"' creates a
duty to adjudicate in conformity to its provisions. Obviously, of course,
and to the extent no new revisions come into being affecting the 1987
enactments, the issues of whether a given situation falls within the ear-
lier provisions of the Penal Code or Article 4-2 and the constituent
elements which control that determination are problems of construing
together both those constituent elements and the conventions.
In that regard, under the language of the United Nations Diplo-
mats Convention,"' state parties must take necessary measures to es-
tablish jurisdiction" 3 over crimes constituting the intentional commis-
sion of: a) a murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or
liberty of an "internationally protected person;"'" b) a violent attack
upon the official premises, the private accommodation or the means of
transport of an internationally protected person likely to endanger that
individual's person or liberty; c) threats to commit any such attack;
and d) attempts to do so." 5 The term used in the Convention, "Head
of State," 6 in the case of Japan refers to the Emperor. That poses a
problem under the Constitution," 7 but the term is commonly used in
diplomatic relations as including the Emperor of Japan as well, and
should pose no difficulties in terms of the interpretation of the lan-
111. See supra note 102.
112. See id.
113. UN Diplomats Convention, supra note 102, art. 3(1).
114. Defined in id. art. 1(1).
115. [Id. art. 2(1)(a)-(d). Accomplices must be punishable by forum penal law. Id.
art. 2(1)(e). - Trans.].
116. Defined in id art. 1(1)(a).
117. [Under Const., supra note 8, art. 1, the Emperor is "the symbol of the State and
of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom
resides sovereign power." Id. art. 4, para. 1 provides: "The Emperor shall perform only
such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and shall not have
powers related to government." - Trans.].
1988]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
guage of the United Nations Diplomats Convention. The term "Head
of Government" in the Convention ' refers to the Prime Minister. 1 9
The Convention, however, applies to heads of state and heads of gov-
ernment only when they are "in a foreign State. '120
VII. EFFECT OF FOREIGN ADJUDICATIONS
Even if a person has been adjudicated a criminal in another coun-
try,1 2 ' there is no bar to the entry of a Japanese criminal adjudication
imposing punishment based on the same acts.122 If the criminal penal-
ties imposed on an offender by a foreign court have been enforced com-
pletely or in part, however, the enforcement of the punishment as-
sessed by the Japanese court must be either reduced or remitted.
23
Before the 1947 revision of the Penal Code, remission of the enforce-
ment of criminal penalties could be allowed in the exercise of judicial
118. The term is included in the definition of "internationally protected person" in
UN Diplomats Convention, supra note 102, art. l(l)(a).
119. [See Const., supra note 8, art. 66(1) ("[Tlhe Cabinet shall consist of the Prime
Minister, who shall be its head, and other Ministers of State, as provided for by law.").
Id. art. 65 provides that "executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet." - Trans.].
120. UN Diplomats Convention, supra note 102, art. 1(1)(a).
121. During the United States military occupation of the Amami Islands, a judgment
by a court of the Government of the Ryukyu Islands was not considered a "foreign adju-
dication," but Article 5 nonetheless was applied by analogy. 9 Keishii 2263 (Sup. Ct., 3d
P.B., Oct. 18, 1955).
122. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 5 (main clause). This, proviso however, is not
within the prohibition against double jeopardy in Const., supra note 8, art. 9.
123. Penal Code, supra note 1, art. 5 (proviso). Remission of the execution or enforce-
ment of punishment differs from remission of punishment as such; only the execution of
criminal penalties (not the criminal adjudication of criminal penalties itself) is remitted.
Nevertheless, it can be very difficult to choose between remission and reduction of penal-
ties as well as to fix the severity of the penalty. The differentiation or determination
becomes extremely difficult to accomplish if the structure of criminal penalties in the
foreign nation differs from that in Japan. Consequently, it is preferable that a court
address specifically the matter of remission or reduction based on the execution of a
foreign penal judgment in the portion of the adjudication covering the criminal penalties
imposed by the court, although the matter essentially is one concerning the execution or
enforcement of those penalties - the responsibility of a public prosecutor under Article
472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See S. DANDO, supra note 60, at 64. The prece-
dent substantially recognizes that preference, but has gone perhaps a little too far in
stating that the remission or reduction of penalties, of necessity, should always be deter-
mined by the courts themselves. See 8 Keishii 2288 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Dec. 24, 1954); 9
Keishu 374 (Sup. Ct., 1st P.B., Feb. 24, 1955), discussed in S. DANDO, supra, at 71 n.10.
The author believes that position to be questionable. See id.
Article 5 should be invoked even in the case of life imprisonment, because it can
benefit offenders in the context of provisional release (parole) from prison. See 9 Keishiu
1103 (Sup. Ct., G.B., June 1, 1955); 9 Keishii 2263 (Sup. Ct., 3d P.B., Oct. 18, 1955).
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discretion, but the revised code strongly adopted a position based on
the universality principle, and therefore required the courts to take
that action. 2 4
124. Consequently, consistent with the universality principle, courts are required to
limit the exercise of their discretion in this regard to a choice between remission and
reduction of penalties, and to the determination of the penalty. The West German Draft
Penal Code of 1962, supra note 46, § 66 (like its predecessors going back to 1913 STGB 8
(W. Ger.) (Draft 1913)), provided that the penalties already enforced pursuant to a for-
eign criminal adjudication should be computed as part of the domestic penalties. (That
approach is embodied in the Japanese precedents cited supra note 105, in the context of
calculating service of sentences to life imprisonment). The Swiss Penal Code, supra note
69, arts. 3-5, embodies a special legislative solution to the problem; see also STGB, art.
3ff (Switz.) (Draft 1918).
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